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One Snapchat post later, and high school student S.J. was 
informed that her post had cost her the chance to be a member of 
her school’s cheer squad.1 Likewise, one blog post later, high school 
student Avery Doninger was informed that she could no longer run 
for student government.2 In yet another case, after creating a 
“parody profile” of his principal on Myspace, high school student 
Justin Layshock was informed that, among other punishments, he 
was banned from all extracurricular activities.3 These cases and 
others beg the question, should schools be allowed to bar students 
from participation in extracurricular activities on the basis of 
students’ online, off-campus speech? 
The importance of this question is magnified by pervasive 
social media use by youth. One study found that the average age 
children start signing up for social media accounts is 12.6 years.4 
And, for children ages thirteen to eighteen, 80% have social media 
accounts.5 This number can only be expected to increase, especially 
as companies such as Facebook create kid-targeted programs.6 
However, despite the increasing relevance of this issue, the 
United States Supreme Court has yet to provide much-needed 
guidance to lower courts on how to handle cases regarding 
students’ off-campus, online speech. While the Supreme Court has 
ruled on a number of student-speech cases, these cases are limited 
to instances where the students’ speech occurred either on-
campus,7 at a school-sponsored event,8 or through school-
sponsored publications.9 Thus, the exact scope and appropriate 
 
 1. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308–10 (D. Utah 2018). 
 2. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339–42 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 3. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
 4. Jacqueline Howard, What’s the Average Age When Kids Get a Social Media Account?, 
CNN (June 22, 2018, 10:22 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/22/health/social-media-
for-kids-parent-curve/index.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Daniel Trotta, Facebook Rolls Out Messenger App for Kids Under 13, REUTERS  
(Dec. 4, 2017, 10:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-messenger-
kids/facebook-rolls-out-messenger-app-for-kids-under-13-idUSKBN1DY28F. 
 7. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 8. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). 
 9. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). 
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application of these Supreme Court cases remains unclear. As a 
result, federal courts have floundered, reaching dramatically 
different conclusions even when analyzing similar cases and 
relying on the exact same legal tests. 
Further, even in cases where students are participating in the 
same extracurricular activity, using the same social media platform 
to express their views, and expressing their views in similarly 
offensive ways, courts have disagreed as to the merits of the 
students’ cases.10 For example, in B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area School 
District, a cheerleader was dismissed from her team for sharing a 
private snap that had a curse-word-laden caption because her 
school considered the post to be disrespectful to her school and 
cheer squad.11 Likewise, in another recent case, Johnson v. Cache 
County School District, another cheerleader was dismissed from her 
team for sharing a private snap that used four-letter words because 
administration thought it violated the cheer squad’s rules about 
“appropriate” social media use.12 Notwithstanding the significant 
similarities in these cases, the reviewing courts came to radically 
different conclusions.13 In B.L., the court ruled in favor of the 
student;14 in Johnson, the court ruled in favor of the school.15 The 
contradictory outcomes in these two cases represent the ongoing 
confusion over how schools should deal with students’ off-campus 
speech on social media. More specifically, these cases illustrate the 
uncertainty schools face when they choose to hold students who 
participate in extracurricular activities to higher speech standards 
than their peers.   
Analyzing these cases, scholars and commentators have argued 
for a number of different, and often contradictory, principles that 
should guide courts’ decisions on student speech.16 In general, 
there has been significant disagreement over whether schools 
should have power to control student speech in the first place. 
Some have argued that “[s]tudents are entitled to all protections 
 
 10. Compare Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1307 (D. Utah 
2018), with B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 11. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
 12. 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1308–10. 
 13. See id. at 1324; B.L., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 616. 
 14. B.L., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 616. 
 15. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. 
 16. See sources cited infra notes 17–19. 
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afforded by the Constitution, and schools do not have a right to 
regulate, restrict, and/or punish their students for behavior that 
would normally be constitutionally protected, no matter how 
offensive or controversial the expression.”17 
In contrast, some have argued that schools should have the 
authority to regulate students’ online, off-campus speech but have 
differed as to what legal standard courts and schools should rely 
on.18 Others have declined to argue for a specific legal standard, but 
have advised that if students are going to be punished under any 
Supreme Court precedent, they must be afforded greater speech 
protections.19 
In terms of student speech specific to the extracurricular 
context, the opinions have been just as wide-ranging. One 
commentator has argued that certain Supreme Court precedents 
should be disposed of entirely and, instead, courts should simply 
recognize the already “well-established limitations on the conduct 
of a student that participates in extracurricular activities.”20 In 
contrast, another commentator has argued that “conditioning 
participation on giving up speech rights contradicts the educational 
goals of extracurricular activities and of public schools[,]” and that 
schools should only be able to punish student speech if there is a 
connection between the speech restriction and the “educational 
goal” of the extracurricular activity.21 
The problem with most of these proposed standards is that, in 
practical effect, they force courts to choose between prioritizing 
student speech or prioritizing the management and efficiency of 
schools at a categorical level. Additionally, some of the proposed 
approaches only advocate for broad Supreme Court standards that 
 
 17. Maiya Dempsey, Note, Easy to Say, Easy to See: Social Media and the Constitutional 
Rights of Public School Students, 17 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 82, 84 (2018). 
 18. Compare Jessica K. Boyd, Note, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace: 
How Much Protection Is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded Under the First Amendment?, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2013); Brittany L. Kaspar, Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Should 
Schools Have the Authority to Punish Online Student Speech?, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187 (2012). 
 19. See Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus 
Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1136 (2010). 
 20. Travis Miller, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. L. 
REV. 303, 330 (2011). 
 21. Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on 
Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 342–43 (2012). 
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are not sufficiently tailored to the unique concerns presented by 
these types of student speech cases. 
In response, this Note offers a new approach that provides 
sufficient protection for students’ rights in the extracurricular 
context, while also ensuring that schools have the necessary leeway 
to regulate harmful student speech. Part I of this Note provides an 
overview of Supreme Court precedent in student speech cases and 
how lower courts have struggled to apply this precedent when 
student speech occurs online and off-campus. Next, Part II analyzes 
two common, competing approaches courts currently rely on to 
analyze and resolve this legal ambiguity. This Part then discusses 
why these approaches, at least applied in isolation, are inadequate 
because both approaches fail to sufficiently protect students’ 
interests. Finally, Part III of this Note proposes what I will refer to 
as the Modified Tinker Standard. This approach provides key 
protections to students, while also ensuring that administrators and 
coaches can effectively manage their schools’ extracurricular 
programs. 
I. OVERVIEW OF SPEECH RIGHTS  
FOR STUDENTS IN EXTRACURRICULARS 
The Supreme Court has declared that students do not “shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”22 At the same time, however, the Court has 
acknowledged that “the constitutional rights of students in public 
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”23 Thus, in student speech cases, the Court has 
sought to draw a careful balance between protecting students’ 
rights and protecting the efficiency and effectiveness of schools. 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
The first major student speech case brought before the Court 
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.24 In 
 
 22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 23. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1982) (citation omitted). 
 24. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
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Tinker, three students wore black armbands to school to show their 
disapproval of the Vietnam War.25 In response, the school district 
suspended the students until they were willing to come back to 
school without wearing their armbands.26 
Upon review, the Court concluded that schools can punish 
students for their speech, but only if the students’ speech 
“materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”27 According 
to the Court, this substantial disruption test was the appropriate 
standard because it ensured that students’ rights to free speech 
were appropriately balanced against schools’ valid need to 
occasionally limit student speech.28 
The Court explained, however, that this standard does not 
mean that schools need to wait until a disruption has actually 
occurred before taking action; but rather, “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to 
freedom of expression.”29 Based on this standard, the Court ruled 
in favor of the students because they “neither interrupted school 
activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of 
others.”30 
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Twenty years later, the Court confronted its next student speech 
case in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.31 In Fraser, high school 
student Matthew Fraser delivered a student government 
nomination speech that constituted an “elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor” at his school’s assembly.32 As a result, 
Fraser was suspended for three days, and he was disallowed from 
speaking at the school’s commencement exercises.33 
When the Court reviewed the case, rather than rely on Tinker’s 
substantial disruption test, it created a different standard specific to 
 
 25. Id. at 504. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 353 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 28. See id. at 511. 
 29. Id. at 508. 
 30. Id. at 514. 
 31. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1982). 
 32. Id. at 678. 
 33. Id. 
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the facts of Fraser.34 Ultimately, the Court concluded, “it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use 
of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”35 Thus, “[t]he 
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as 
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a 
sexually explicit monologue . . . .”36 Therefore, the Court upheld the 
school’s decision to punish Fraser for his speech.37 
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Shortly after Fraser came Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.38 
In Hazelwood, three students alleged that their high school principal 
violated their First Amendment rights when he deleted articles that 
discussed controversial topics, such as teen pregnancy, from an 
issue of the school newspaper.39 The question before the Court was 
whether schools had “authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”40 In answer, the 
Court responded that schools have authority to refuse student 
speech that might reasonably be perceived to be inconsistent with 
“the shared values of a civilized social order.”41 Otherwise, schools 
would be unable to adequately fulfill their key role in “awakening 
the child to cultural values, in preparing [the student] for later 
professional training, and in helping [the student] adjust normally 
to his [or her] environment.”42 Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the 
school, and held, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
 
 34. See id. at 680–81. 
 35. Id. at 683. 
 36. Id. at 685. 
 37. Id. at 686. 
 38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 39. Id. at 262–63. 
 40. Id. at 271. 
 41. Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
 42. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
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actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”43 
4. Morse v. Frederick 
Finally, and most recently, in Morse v. Frederick, students at a 
school-sponsored event unfurled a banner that stated, “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.”44 To the principal, this banner promoted illegal 
drug use. When one of the students refused to take down the 
banner, he was suspended.45 
As in Fraser, the Court in Morse affirmed the right of schools to 
control student speech when students are in their school’s 
custody.46 And, in Morse, although the students were not on school 
campus, the banner was unfurled during normal school hours, 
during a school-sanctioned trip.47 Thus, the Court concluded, “a 
principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict 
student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably 
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”48 
B. Unclear Precedent and Conflicting Applications by Lower Courts 
 Notwithstanding the insights provided by Supreme Court 
precedent, the exact scope and application of these cases to 
students’ online, off-campus speech is debatable. Aside from Morse, 
which was brought before the Court in 2007, the other student 
speech cases that the Court has reviewed were decided at a time 
when the technological advancements accessible to most American 
students today were unimaginable. And, even if the rules 
established in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse could be easily 
transplanted into the context of students’ online speech, members 
of the Court have repeatedly expressed reservation about wide-
ranging application of the rules from these cases. For example, in 
his concurrence in Fraser, Justice Brennan stated, “[i]f respondent 
had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he 
could not have been penalized simply because government officials 
 
 43. Id. at 273. 
 44. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 398. 
 46. See id. at 397. 
 47. Id. at 400–01. 
 48. Id. at 403. 
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considered his language to be inappropriate; the Court’s opinion 
does not suggest otherwise.”49 Later, the majority in Hazelwood 
appeared to validate Justice Brennan’s interpretation, stating, “[a] 
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 
‘basic educational mission’ even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school.”50 In Morse, the Court also took 
care to word its holding in such a way that narrowed its 
application: “The question thus becomes whether a principal may, 
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a 
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.”51 
Thus, it is unclear how lower courts should apply Supreme 
Court precedent, and where the rights of schools and students 
stand. As Justice Thomas lamented in his concurrence in Morse, “I 
am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a 
right to speak in schools except when they do not—a standard 
continuously developed through litigation against local schools 
and their administrators.”52 
Although the lower courts have tried to faithfully apply 
Supreme Court precedent, they have often come to contradictory 
conclusions. And, although there are cases where the facts are 
distinct enough to possibly justify such conflicting holdings, “even 
identical facts would likely lead to contradictory rulings given the 
circuits’ analyses on this issue.”53 For example, consider the 
following two cases involving online, off-campus student speech: 
1. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District 
In Layshock, high school senior Justin Layshock used his 
grandmother’s home computer to create a highly derogatory 
Myspace “parody profile” of his school principal, Eric Trosch.54 For 
example, Justin gave the following answers to Myspace’s “tell me 
 
 49. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 50. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
 51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 53. Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the Age 
of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 918 (2012). 
 54. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–08 (2011). 
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about yourself” section: “Birthday: too drunk to remember . . . In 
the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big 
dick[.]”55 Justin also claimed that Principal Trosch belonged to a 
club called “Steroids International,” and he listed Principal 
Trosch’s interests as “Transgender, Appreciators of Alcoholic 
Beverages.”56 
This profile “‘spread like wildfire’ and . . . reached most, if not 
all,” of the students at Justin’s high school.57 Inspired by Justin’s 
post, three other students also created parody profiles, which 
ended up being even more vulgar and offensive than Justin’s.58 As 
a result of these profiles, computer programming classes had to be 
cancelled and, for six days, student computer use was strictly 
limited to the computer labs and library, where internet use could 
be closely supervised.59 Once it was discovered that Justin was 
responsible for the first Myspace profile, he was given a ten-day, 
out-of-school suspension, placed in an Alternative Education 
Program, banned from all extracurricular activities, and not 
allowed to participate in his graduation ceremony.60 
When Justin’s case made it to the Third Circuit, the court began 
its analysis with a discussion of the Tinker standard.61 Importantly, 
the court found it meaningful that the district court could not 
“establish[] a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and a 
substantial disruption of the school environment[.]”62 Thus, the 
court concluded that Tinker did not apply to Justin’s case.63 
Additionally, the court concluded that Fraser did not apply.64 Citing 
to Morse, the court explained, “Fraser does not allow the School 
District to punish Justin for expressive conduct which occurred 
outside of the school context.”65 
 
 55. Id. at 208. 
 56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 209. 
 60. Id. at 210. 
 61. See id. at 211–12. 
 62. Id. at 214 (first alteration in original) (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 219. 
 65. Id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007)). 
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In reaching these conclusions, the court also evinced a strong 
dislike for the idea that schools could monitor students’ online 
speech.66 The court explained, “[i]t would be an unseemly and 
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school 
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions 
there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she 
participates in school sponsored activities.”67 Thus, the court ruled 
in favor of Justin, and held that the school could not punish his 
online, expressive conduct.68 
2. Doninger v. Niehoff 
In contrast, consider Doninger v. Niehoff.69 In Doninger, student 
council member Avery Doninger expressed anger over the way her 
school had handled an upcoming student event, Jamfest, on 
livejournal.com.70 In her post, Avery referred to school 
administrators as “douchebags” and encouraged students to 
continue contacting Paula Schwartz, superintendent of the school 
district, to complain about the alleged cancellation of the event.71 
As Avery stated at the end of her post, “if you want to write 
something or call her to piss her off more. im [sic] down.”72 
Prior to Avery’s post, Jamfest had already been causing 
problems between students and administrators.73 So, even though 
administration was not aware of Avery’s post until about two 
weeks later, it is unlikely that administration thought it was 
unusual when, the morning after Avery’s post, they continued to 
receive phone calls, emails, and personal visits regarding Jamfest.74 
Additionally, a group of upset students had gathered outside the 
administration’s office.75 (Critically, this group of students left as 
 
 66. See id. at 216–19. 
 67. Id. at 216. 
 68. Id. at 219. 
 69. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 70. Id. at 339–41 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 71. Id. at 340. 
 72. Id. at 341. 
 73.  Id. at 349 (“According to the undisputed facts in this case, the controversy over 
Jamfest’s scheduling had already resulted in a deluge of phone calls and emails, several 
disrupted schedules, and many upset students even before Doninger posted her comments 
on livejournal.com.” (emphasis in original)). 
 74. See id. at 339–42. 
 75. Id. at 341. 
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soon as Avery explained to them that Jamfest was not cancelled.)76 
Because of these things, administrators testified that they were 
forced to either miss or arrive late to “school-related activities . . . 
including a health seminar, an observation of a non-tenured 
teacher, and a superintendents’ meeting.”77 When administration 
later discovered Avery’s post after these events had taken place, 
they punished her by disallowing her from running for senior class 
secretary.78 
Like Justin, Avery and her parents brought suit. Although the 
Second Circuit ultimately decided the Doninger case in favor of the 
defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, the court concluded 
that Avery’s case likely met the Tinker test, and that even Fraser was 
potentially applicable to Avery’s case.79 As the court explained, 
Tinker “provid[ed] ‘substantial grounds’ for the school officials here 
‘to have concluded [they] had legitimate justification under the law 
for acting as [they] did.’”80 
To start, it was reasonable for school officials to anticipate a 
substantial disruption because of the language Avery had used in 
her post, and the fact that the information she had provided was 
“at best misleading and at wors[t] false[.]”81 Additionally, 
“Doninger’s blog post directly pertained to an event at LMHS, . . . 
it invited other students to read and respond to it by contacting 
school officials, [and] th[e] students did in fact post comments on 
the post[.]”82 Neither was Fraser out of the question.83 Rather than 
completely rule out Fraser like the Third Circuit did, the court 
concluded that because “the applicability of Fraser to plainly 
offensive off-campus student speech is uncertain,” so even Fraser 
potentially cut against Avery’s case.84 
Finally, there was already sufficient evidence that tensions were 
running high about Jamfest.85 Neither party contested the fact that 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 342. 
 79. Id. at 343–48. 
 80. Id. at 348 (second and third alterations in original) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 208 (2001)). 
 81. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2008)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. 
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“the controversy over Jamfest’s scheduling had already resulted in 
a deluge of phone calls and emails, several disrupted schedules, 
and many upset students even before Doninger posted her 
comments on livejournal.com.”86 Thus, because tensions at the 
school were already running high, the court concluded that “there 
remain[ed] no triable issue here as to whether it was objectively 
reasonable for school administrators to conclude that Doninger’s 
posting was potentially disruptive to the degree required by 
Tinker.”87 
3. The irreconcilable rationales in Layshock and Doninger 
The Layshock and Doninger cases showcase the extent to which 
students’ rights are currently determined by jurisdictional lines. 
Both Justin and Avery used online platforms to say derogatory 
things about members of their school administrations, and both 
Avery and Justin’s actions ended up impacting what took place on-
campus. However, Avery’s post, which was arguably much less 
offensive than Justin’s outrageous Myspace parody profile, was 
punishable, while Justin’s post was not. Most notably, Avery’s post, 
which appeared to only cause slight inconveniences for school 
administrators, such as making administrators late to certain 
meetings, was determined to be a substantial disruption to the 
school. In contrast, Justin’s post, which arguably had a greater 
impact on the student body and teachers, given the resulting class 
cancellation and nearly week-long limitations on school computer 
use, was not considered a substantial disruption.88 
This, of course, is not to say that there are not meaningful 
factual distinctions between the two cases. Unlike Avery, Justin 
was not a student leader.89 And, where Avery’s punishment was 
limited to the extracurricular context, Justin’s post got him 
 
 86. Id. at 349 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 348–49. 
 88. Perhaps, if the school had specifically argued that Justin’s post had caused a 
substantial disruption, the court may have been more willing to consider the application of 
Tinker to Justin’s actions. However, even if this was the case, it is unlikely that the court 
would have been willing to give too much weight to this argument, due to its aversion to 
allowing schools to monitor students’ off-campus speech. 
 89. However, as this Note will later show, even if the facts of the cases are much more 
similar (e.g., the students are both being banned from the same extracurricular activity, for 
the same type of speech), courts will still come to different conclusions. 
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suspended, disallowed from participating in his graduation 
ceremony, banned from all extracurricular activities, etc.90 Another 
difference is that in Avery’s case, tensions were already running 
high, whereas at Justin’s school, his post did not occur within the 
context of a problem that was already schoolwide. This is 
meaningful because the higher tensions at a school are, the more a 
court is justified in holding that a school administration was 
reasonable in concluding that a student’s actions could cause a 
substantial disruption. 
These distinctions alone, however, still fail to explain the 
serious differences in how the courts applied Tinker and Fraser. 
According to the Third Circuit’s decision in Justin Layshock’s case, 
the Tinker and Fraser tests can only be applied in specific 
circumstances; in contrast, to the Second Circuit, Tinker is expansive 
in its reach, and even Fraser isn’t definitively off the table. The 
policy rationales motivating each court are also very different. In 
Layshock, the court was incredibly sensitive to the dangers of 
allowing a school’s authority to extend beyond the literal 
schoolhouse gate; in contrast, the Doninger court seemed relatively 
unconcerned about the possible opportunities for school overreach, 
and it only mentioned the issue in passing.91 Thus, cases like 
Layshock and Doninger provide more questions than answers. 
C. Conflicts in the Extracurricular Context 
Finally, the division amongst courts is especially highlighted in 
the narrower context of regulating the off-campus, online speech of 
students that choose to participate in extracurricular activities. For 
 
 90. Besides the stark fact that Justin’s punishment was clearly harsher than Avery’s 
punishment, this distinction is also worth noting because a student is likely to receive greater 
legal protection if his or her access to school itself has been limited. All state constitutions 
mandate the creation of a public school system, and many state constitutions specifically 
state that their school system will be open to all children of the state. See Emily Parker, 50-
State Review: Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMMISSION STS. 1, 5–22 
(Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-
for-public-education-1.pdf. In contrast, to the knowledge of the author, there are no federal 
or state laws that hold that extracurricular participation is a right. Therefore, a student 
automatically has much greater legal protection if her school’s punishment threatens her 
right to an education, not just her desire to participate in an extracurricular activity. 
 91. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351. The Doninger court stated, “To be clear, we do not 
conclude in any way that school administrators are immune from First Amendment scrutiny 
when they react to student speech by limiting students’ participation in extracurricular 
activities.” Id. But, the court did nothing to expand on this statement. See id. 
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example, consider the details of the following conflicting 
cheerleader cases. 
1. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District 
In B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District, a high school 
cheerleader, B.L., posted a picture to Snapchat of her and her friend 
“holding up their middle fingers[.]”92 Superimposed over the 
picture was the caption, “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck 
everything.”93 The snap was taken in front of a local convenience 
store over the weekend, and B.L. was not participating in any 
school activity at the time.94 Additionally, B.L. had only sent the 
snap to her private followers.95 
Notwithstanding these facts, when B.L.’s snap was shown to 
school authorities, B.L.’s coaches removed her from the squad.96 
According to the coaches, B.L.’s dismissal was justified on the basis 
that she had used profanity, and that she had violated the cheer 
squad’s rules. Among other things, the rules stated, 
Please have respect for your school, coaches, teachers, and other 
cheerleaders and teams. Remember, you are representing your 
school when at games, fundraisers, and other events. Good 
sportsmanship will be enforced, this includes foul language and 
inappropriate gestures . . . . There will be no toleration of any 
negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or 
coaches placed on the internet.97 
As a result, B.L.’s parents brought suit against the school 
district, seeking a preliminary injunction.98 Fortunately for B.L., the 
court concluded that B.L. was likely to succeed on the merits of her 
claim and granted her motion.99 First, because B.L.’s school did not 
claim that her snap had caused a substantial disruption, the court 
concluded, with little to no analysis, that B.L.’s punishment could 
 
 92. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 610  
(M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 611. Relevantly, prior to this time, B.L. had already been granted a Temporary 
Restraining Order, which kept her from being removed from the team. Id. 
 99. See id. at 616. 
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not be justified under Tinker.100 Second, B.L. could not be punished 
for the offensive language in her snap because the Third Circuit had 
already determined that Fraser was inapplicable to off-campus 
speech.101 
Further, as a policy matter, the court was very uncomfortable 
with the idea of enforcing school punishments that would 
essentially allow students to become the “Thought Police—
reporting every profanity uttered—for the District.”102 Therefore, 
the court refused to offer a different framework for analyzing 
student speech cases where the punishment involved removal from 
an extracurricular activity.103 The court also concluded that if the 
cheerleading rules remained in place, “B.L. would be subject to 
continuing censorship of her protected speech.”104 Accordingly, the 
court granted B.L.’s motion.105 
2. Johnson v. Cache County School District106 
Conversely, in a nearly identical case, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah chose to rule in favor of the school district.107 In 
Johnson v. Cache County School District, shortly after finding out that 
she had made her high school cheer squad, S.J. posted a video to 
Snapchat of her and four other cheerleaders singing along to Big 
Sean’s song, “I.D.F.W.U.”108 The snap was approximately eight 
seconds long and showed the girls wearing their Mountain Crest 
cheer shirts as they sang, “I don’t fuck with you, you little stupid 
 
 100. See id. at 612 n.7. 
 101. See id. at 613. 
 102. Id. at 614. 
 103. See id. at 613–14. 
 104. Id. at 615. 
 105. After successfully getting a preliminary injunction, B.L.’s case was again brought 
before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On March 21, 2019, the 
judge issued a ruling in favor of B.L. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 
F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2019). However, on April 12, 2019, the school district appealed. See 
Brief for Appellant at 1, B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 19-1842 (June 28, 
2019). So, the ultimate outcome of this case is still uncertain.  
 106. The Author worked as a law clerk for the Litigation Division of the Utah Attorney 
General’s Office that defended the Cache County School District in the Johnson lawsuit. All 
information included in this Note about the Johnson case is drawn from the public record; no 
confidential information has been disclosed. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office, the Cache County School District, 
or any of the individuals involved in the litigation. 
 107. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1324 (D. Utah 2018). 
 108. Id. at 1308–09. 
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ass bitch, I ain’t fucking with you.”109 In addition to using similarly 
offensive language to the student in B.L., S.J.’s post was also private, 
and only viewable to thirty to forty of S.J.’s followers.110 Unlike B.L., 
however, around thirty minutes after posting, S.J. decided that the 
snap was inappropriate to share, and she deleted it.111 
Unfortunately for S.J. though, one of the recipients of her post took 
a screenshot of the snap and showed school administrators and 
cheer coaches.112 As a result, S.J. was dismissed from the squad.113 
According to S.J.’s coaches and administrators, her punishment 
was justified for several reasons.114 During the cheer tryout process, 
administrators and coaches had spoken “at length” about 
appropriate social media use.115 The squad’s coach had told the 
students “not to post any derogatory or nasty comments, to refrain 
from bullying or any ‘catty’ comments, and not to post anything 
that would do dishonor to themselves, their family, or their 
school.”116 Administrators had also explained that, in the past, 
cheerleaders’ inappropriate social media use had escalated 
problems between Mountain Crest and the neighboring high 
school, Ridgeline.117 Further, upon being informed that she had 
made the cheer squad, S.J. had been encouraged not to post 
anything about the results until they were formally announced the 
following day.118  
As for the content of S.J.’s post, administration thought that the 
language in S.J.’s post “bordered on threatening and was informed 
that the video made other girls who had not been chosen to feel 
bullied and that S.J. and the other girls were gloating.”119 In 
addition to these factors, the school also concluded that S.J.’s 
dismissal was appropriate because S.J. remained “unrepentant and 
insistent that the post was accidental and unintentional[,]” a claim 
 
 109. Id. at 1309. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1309–10. 
 114. See id. at 1307–10. 
 115. Id. at 1308. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1308–09. 
 119. Id. at 1310. 
005.WADDOUPS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
854 
 
that led administrators to conclude that S.J. was lying to them about 
her choice to post the video.120 
Like B.L., S.J. brought her case to court, and asked for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.121 
However, unlike B.L., S.J. was not granted either remedy.122 First, 
the court concluded that it was unclear whether S.J.’s speech could 
potentially be punished under Fraser because the “‘school context’ 
[referred to in Fraser] [could] be broader than simply ‘on school 
grounds.’”123 Further, S.J.’s speech “could be viewed as more 
vulgar than the offensive speech in Fraser.”124 
The court also concluded that it was unlikely that S.J.’s speech 
was protected under Tinker.125 Given the nature of S.J.’s speech, it 
was “subject to lesser protection than the ‘nondisruptive, passive 
expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker.’”126 Further, the court 
concluded that the school had successfully shown that S.J.’s video 
had “the effect of materially and substantially disrupting the work 
and discipline of the cheer squad in a variety of ways.”127 It was 
insubordinate,  “ran the risk of fueling the rivalry between 
Mountain Crest and Ridgeline, and had the potential of causing 
conflict between students at Mountain Crest.”128 
Additionally, S.J.’s punishment was also likely to be found 
valid on the basis that “[t]here is a difference between excluding a 
student from participation in a voluntary extracurricular activity 
and disciplining or suspending a student from class.”129 Essentially, 
by going out for the team, S.J. and all other students who 
participated in extracurricular activities necessarily subjected 
themselves to higher standards.130 As the court specifically noted, 
“this court disagrees with the B.L. court’s failure to consider the 
difference between a school suspension and participation in an 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1307. 
 122. Id. at 1324. 
 123. Id. at 1317 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)). 
 124. Id. at 1319. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1320. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1321. 
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extracurricular activity.”131 Thus, “[e]ven if S.J. had not used 
profanity, she could have been disciplined for insubordination, 
lying to administrators, and failing to take responsibility for her 
actions.”132 
Finally, unlike in B.L., where the court specifically discussed the 
dangers of chilling student speech, the Johnson court did not think 
that the cheer squad rules would continue to negatively impact S.J. 
As the court summarized, “S.J. has no specific plan to post anything 
inappropriate in the future and it is a condition of participating in 
an extracurricular activity, not a condition of her right to attend 
school.”133 Therefore, since the school’s actions were not a clear 
violation of S.J.’s rights, the court ruled in favor of the school.134 
3. The irreconcilable outcomes of B.L. and Johnson 
Few factual differences exist between B.L. and Johnson. Both 
students’ posts were connected to cheer and, according to their 
schools, both cheerleaders showed disrespect towards their schools 
and violated their squads’ rules. The only significant incongruity 
between these cases is the fundamentally different interpretations 
the reviewing courts and the parties to these cases had of Tinker and 
Fraser, and their more general disagreement about how 
extracurricular activities should be treated under the law.135 
II. INSUFFICIENT CURRENT APPROACHES  
FOR EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES  
Although it is still unclear how courts should resolve the dicey 
issues presented in cases like B.L. and Johnson, trends for how 
courts should evaluate these cases have begun to emerge. Most 
commonly, the rationales that courts and commentators rely on 
tend to diverge into one of two approaches. Under the first 
approach, schools can create higher standards for students that 
participate in extracurricular activities. Under the second approach, 
schools can rely on courts’ generous application of the Tinker 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1316. 
 134. Id. at 1323–24. 
 135. To see just how diametrically opposed the B.L. and Johnson courts are, see a later 
case B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438–39 (M.D. Pa. 2019). 
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standard. Unfortunately, although both of these approaches have 
their merits, as I will explain below, both approaches also suffer 
from serious defects. 
A. Approach #1: Schools Can Create Higher Standards  
for Students that Participate in Extracurricular Activities. 
Some courts136 and commentators137 have concluded that one of 
the best ways to resolve the debacle over students’ online speech in 
the extracurricular context is to simply recognize that by going out 
for the team, students necessarily subject themselves to higher 
standards. This solution, which I will refer to as the Higher Standards 
Approach, is attractive for a number of reasons. First, this rule cuts 
down on the complexity and uncertainty courts face when students 
bring claims that their rights have been violated. Rather than 
struggling to apply less-than-clear Supreme Court precedent to 
student speech in the digital age, courts can simply defer to a 
school’s sense of judgment. Such deference is merited on the basis 
that participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege, not a 
right. Additionally, it is schools, not courts, that are in the best 
position to determine how extracurricular programs should be run. 
Second, although such outcomes would not necessarily always 
be fair, the Higher Standards Approach would at least bring much 
needed clarity to schools and even to students—at least in a sense. 
Through this approach, schools would be able to confidently assert 
boundaries for different student groups, rather than always be 
uncertain as to whether their rules will embroil the school district 
in a nasty lawsuit. Additionally, students would go into 
extracurricular activities knowing that their school’s standards for 
its extracurriculars are nonnegotiable and, if in doubt, they should 
err on the side of caution when posting anything on social media.138 
 
 136. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011); Johnson, 323 
F. Supp. 3d at 1321. 
 137. See Miller, supra note 20, at 305. 
 138. Although it is possible to imagine a scenario where a court would conclude that a 
school’s heightened standards for extracurricular activities had gone so far as to violate 
students’ constitutional rights, as I will explain later in this Note, such outcomes will only 
occur in rare, exceptional cases. 
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Third, both Supreme Court139 and some circuit court140 
precedents support the proposition that schools can hold students 
who participate in extracurricular activities to higher standards. 
For example, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, a student and 
his parents challenged the school district’s policy of randomly drug 
testing student athletes.141 Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of 
the school.142 As the Court explained, “[b]y choosing to ‘go out for 
the team,’ [students] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of 
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.”143 
Additionally, the Court analogized that “[s]omewhat like adults 
who choose to participate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students 
who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to 
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including 
privacy.”144 More recently, in Doninger145 and Johnson,146 the courts 
have also justified their decisions, at least in part, upon this 
rationale.   
Notwithstanding the benefits of this Higher Standards Approach, 
transplanting principles from cases like Vernonia (which did not 
implicate First Amendment concerns) to cases involving student 
speech on social media has a number of unwelcome consequences. 
When constitutional rights are at stake, the efficiency and ease of 
bright-line rules should not supplant equity and justice. Although 
this approach has the benefits of being relatively straightforward 
and easy to apply, it is insufficient to ensure that students’ most 
important rights are protected. This is because it allows courts to 
give far too much deference to schools’ decisions on student speech. 
Rather than resolve more complex questions, such as whether the 
student’s speech actually had a substantial impact on the school, or 
rely on other, equally difficult-to-apply Supreme Court precedent, 
this enables courts to take the path of least resistance and simply 
conclude that the student essentially “signed up” for the speech 
 
 139. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
 140. See, e.g., Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589–600 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 141. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651. 
 142. Id. at 666. 
 143. Id. at 657. 
 144. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); U.S. v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)). 
 145. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011) 
 146. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1321 (D. Utah 2018). 
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restrictions at issue by choosing to participate in the activity. Thus, 
with the exception of cases involving outrageous encroachment on 
student speech, courts will likely defer to schools’ student-speech 
restrictions.  
Further, even though some court precedents have established 
that students who participate in extracurricular activities may be 
held to higher standards than normal students, there is a 
meaningful difference between allowing schools to punish students 
when they are on school campus, or at a school-sanctioned event, 
and allowing schools to punish students for completely off-campus 
speech. If a coach could not discipline players during practice, or if 
club advisors were required to tolerate any and all behavior at their 
events, these extracurricular programs would doubtlessly suffer. 
And when parents place their children in the care and custody of a 
school, the school has a duty to protect and guide them. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “When parents place minor children 
in private schools for their education, the teachers and 
administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the 
children entrusted to them.”147 Likewise, it makes sense that 
parents delegate some degree of authority to schools when their 
children are participating in an extracurricular activity at school, or 
at another location under the direct supervision of school 
authorities. The same cannot be said, however, for students who 
are at home using Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, etc. As the Second 
Circuit summarized, “our willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s 
expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, 
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”148 Thus, the facts in Vernonia, where 
the relevant student activity took place on school campus, are again 
distinguishable from cases where students participating in an 
extracurricular activity post something online while they are off-
campus. 
Ambiguity and uncertainty for students is also certain to result 
if schools can impose broad regulations on students’ speech 
because of their involvement in extracurricular activities. In 
contrast, the drug testing in Vernonia does not even come close to 
 
 147. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
 148. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45  
(2d Cir. 1979). 
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implicating the ambiguities associated with First Amendment 
concerns. Drug tests are analyzed through scientific means and 
have a relatively limited range of outcomes. The same cannot be 
said for student speech, which is much more subject to variables 
like context, interpretation, and bias. 
This is especially the case when students are communicating 
online. Statements like “I ain’t fucking with you” may seem 
objectively offensive to coaches and school administrators. But, 
without seeing the student’s demeanor, body-language, and 
understanding the context surrounding the statement, it is 
impossible to tell whether a student truly intended to disrespect 
coaches and undermine their team. Instead, the student may have 
been merely seeking attention, or blowing off steam about an 
entirely unrelated matter. Or, the student may come from a home 
or neighborhood where expletives like “fuck” are everyday words 
used to express a broad range of emotions; in other words, to some 
students, such expletives may not be particularly weighty, or 
highly offensive terms.  
Even if the import of students’ online speech could always be 
fairly understood by just looking at the words on the screen, it 
would be far better for courts to specify that schools may only 
penalize students for very specific, narrow categories of online 
speech. Otherwise, schools are at liberty to penalize students for 
any online speech the school perceives to be at odds with the 
purpose of the extracurricular activity.  
Requiring schools to have narrow, specific speech restrictions 
has a host of benefits. First, such a requirement would provide 
students and their parents with clearer guidelines. For example, 
there is a significant difference between a school rule that students 
may be dismissed for personally attacking their coach online (such 
as by advocating that the coach be fired), and a school rule that 
students may be dismissed for any “inappropriate” social media 
use. Requiring greater specificity—or narrower speech restrictions 
on students—would also prevent a school from abusing its power 
and silencing student speech on the mere basis that the student’s 
speech is rude, unflattering, or merely disagreed with by the school. 
This would also ensure that school officials do not use broad speech 
restrictions to selectively enforce vague standards against students 
who have beliefs, opinions, and lifestyles that fall outside of school 
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or community norms: the broader the speech restrictions, the easier 
it is for schools to justify their choice to punish a student after-the-
fact. 
Another reason the Higher Standards Approach is problematic is 
that applying cases like Vernonia to students’ online speech gives 
schools unprecedented authority to shape students’ expression 
and, in turn, shape students’ thoughts and views. The core of 
Vernonia is essentially a take-it-or-leave-it approach: if students 
want to participate in extracurriculars, they must be willing to be 
held to higher standards. If students don’t want to be held to higher 
standards, they can quit the team. Before the digital age, however, 
the number of ways that schools could actually hold students to 
higher standards was much more limited than it is now. The school 
may have been able to regulate a student’s conduct at school 
dances, in class, or other similar school-sanctioned events—but 
nothing nearly as personal as the private messages students send 
to their friends.149 
Thus, allowing schools to hold students who participate in 
extracurricular activities to indeterminate “higher standards,” 
while also allowing schools to monitor students’ social media 
speech, will likely have a chilling effect on student speech. At the 
cost of keeping their spot on the team, students may be forced to 
radically change some of the most personal aspects of their life, 
such as the messages they send to a single friend; or, they may be 
required to forsake sharing their opinions on social media 
altogether if they know that the school will punish them for 
expressing any viewpoints contrary to school or community norms.   
Finally, the fact that students do not have a right to 
extracurricular participation does not mean that such activities are 
not critical to a student’s education, or that students should be 
afforded little to no protection in this area of the law. As the 
Supreme Court acknowledged, “The process of educating our 
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the 
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the 
 
 149. Obviously, not all social media is private. However, at the time this Note was 
written, some instant message applications allow for messages to disappear unless the 
recipient screenshots the message. See, e.g., Our Privacy Principles, SNAP INC., 
https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/privacy-center/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“You 
decide . . . just how long your Snaps stick around.”) 
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shared values of a civilized social order.”150 Of the many lofty goals 
of the American school system, the Supreme Court has said that 
schools are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him adjust normally to his environment.”151 
Undoubtedly, extracurricular activities provide just such 
opportunities for students to learn the “values of a civilized social 
order”152 and gain critical skills.  
A wide variety of empirical studies have shown that there is a 
meaningful link between extracurriculars and such student success. 
According to National Education Longitudinal Study data, high 
school participation in extracurricular activities is “positively 
associated with post secondary educational attainment, voting, 
volunteering, and occupational factors 2 and 8 years after high 
school[.]”153 Scholars have also found that extracurricular activities 
“benefited socioeconomically disadvantaged students as much or 
more than advantaged students.”154 Likewise, other researchers 
have concluded, “that when vulnerable youth are exposed to a 
broad distribution of extracurricular activity settings . . . their 
chances of being educationally resilient are enhanced.”155 It is these 
disadvantaged students, who are unlikely to have access to legal 
services, that will bear the brunt of extracurricular policies that 
unjustly circumscribe their First Amendment rights. 
If courts want to ensure that the critical benefits of 
extracurriculars are truly available to students, they must not give 
 
 150. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 493 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 151. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 152. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 153. The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 
https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-activities/ (last visited Dec. 23, 
2019) (citing Margo Gardner et al., Adolescents’ Participation in Organized Activities and 
Developmental Success 2 and 8 Years After High School: Do Sponsorship, Duration, and Intensity 
Matter?, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 814, 814–30 (2008)). Notably, in the cited study, 
researchers controlled for “several demographic, achievement, individual and family 
factors.” Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting Herbert W. Marsh & Sabina Kleitman, Extracurricular School Activities: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Nonlinear, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 464, 464 (2002)). 
 155. Id. (quoting Stephen C. Peck et al., Exploring the Roles of Extracurricular Activity 
Quantity and Quality in the Educational Resilience of Vulnerable Adolescents: Variable- and Pattern-
Centered Approaches, 64 J. SOC. ISSUES 135, 135–56 (2008)). 
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schools a blank check to remove students from extracurricular 
activities.156 
B. Approach #2: Generous Application of the Tinker Standard 
Courts have often looked to Tinker to resolve student speech 
issues in the extracurricular context. Tinker is an effective catchall: 
unlike cases such as Fraser and Morse, where the Court took care to 
specifically limit the scope of its holdings, the language in Tinker 
indicates that the substantial disruption test is susceptible to broad 
application. As the Court stated in Tinker, 
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.157 
For this reason, even courts that are divided in their views have 
relied, at least in part, on Tinker when examining students’ off-
campus, online speech.158 Thus, to depart from the Tinker standard 
would mean losing a helpful, intuitive rule,159 and it would also 
mean taking away one of the few tests most courts agree can be 
effectively applied to cases involving students’ online speech. 
Unfortunately though, some courts’ application of the Tinker 
standard has led to case law that is both confusing and 
disingenuous to the substantial disruption test. Although Tinker 
cautioned courts that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
 
 156. This of course does not mean that students who participate in extracurricular 
activities should never be treated differently from the student body at large. There is value 
in allowing schools to create heightened standards for students that participate in 
extracurricular activities. Instead, this Note argues that if courts choose to give schools 
unprecedented power to control students’ speech, there should be a corresponding increase 
in protections given to students who choose to participate in extracurriculars. 
 157. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)  
(emphasis added). 
 158. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. District, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1318–19 (D. Utah 
2018); B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 612 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 159. I use the word intuitive because it seems only logical to conclude that matters that 
could substantially disrupt a school are not limited to what takes place at the physical school. 
If anything, with the immense amount of time students spend online, things said on social 
media may have even greater potential to substantially disrupt a school than what actually 
occurs on-campus. 
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expression,”160 courts are often all too willing to defer to a school’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a substantial disruption.161 
Although school administrators likely understand the dynamics of 
their schools better than courts ever will, even highly 
knowledgeable, involved administrators are still susceptible to 
overreacting or taking a student’s post personally. These realities, 
combined with the natural desire to reduce conflict and maintain 
order, can lead even the best-intentioned administrators to perceive 
a substantial disruption where none exists. 
For example, in Johnson, it was questionable at best that S.J.’s 
snap would have caused a substantial disruption for the cheer 
team. Based on the evidence presented to the court, it was unclear 
how many members of the cheer squad, the rival school, or 
students at Mountain Crest at large actually saw the post.162 And, 
although S.J. used what many may consider to be inappropriate 
language in her post, to say that her post could reasonably be 
viewed as subversive, or that it was intended to undermine the 
authority of her coaches, is taking the matter to the extreme. 
S.J. ultimately deleted her snap only thirty minutes after it was 
posted—a sign that she may have realized how her coaches and 
school would view her actions, and that she did not want to cause 
trouble. Further, even if S.J. had not deleted the post, it is only 
realistic to expect that students, including those that participate in 
extracurricular activities, will inevitably make mistakes and 
disobey certain rules. This is especially true if such rules require 
them to modify very personal aspects of their lives, such as the 
pictures and videos they privately share with friends, or the 
language that they typically use at home. Just because a rule has 
been disobeyed does not mean that every time this happens a 
substantial disruption has occurred.  
 
 160. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 161. See Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff 
Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON L. REV. 
247, 285 (2010); Miller, supra note 20, at 323–24. 
 162. Although the court importantly acknowledged that “SnapChat stories can be 
saved and screen recorded by anyone in the SnapChat story and sent to others[,]” the court 
could only confirm that S.J. had sent her post to approximately thirty to forty of her personal 
contacts, Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1309, and that her “unknown group of ‘followers’ . . . may 
have included other students who did not make the cheer squad.” Id. at 1317  
(emphasis added). 
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Neither should the school’s claim that S.J.’s post could have 
caused a schoolwide substantial disruption satisfy the Tinker test. 
First, even if merely using swear words in a vague, celebratory post 
allegedly made some students feel “bullied” the fact that S.J.’s post 
may have made some students feel sad about not making the 
cheerleading squad is too low a threshold for a substantial 
disruption. Although it may be easy to sympathize with the students 
on the receiving end of this post, if the substantial disruption test 
can be met any time that a single, vague statement makes a handful 
of students feel offended, it is hard to imagine what would not 
create a substantial disruption.  
 Second, it is quite a stretch to claim that S.J.’s snap would 
ultimately encourage interschool conflict between Mountain Crest 
and Ridgeline, and that these problems would then lead to a 
substantial disruption for Mountain Crest High. Not only was S.J.’s 
snap private, nothing in S.J.’s snap appeared to be directed at 
Ridgeline. Additionally, even if S.J.’s snap encouraged other 
cheerleaders to create similar posts, it is unclear how even this 
would lead to increased rivalry, or that this rivalry would then have 
a substantial impact on the school. In the defendant’s 
memorandum, counsel noted that, in the past, the rivalry between 
the two schools had “spawned displays of racist symbols, led to 
occasional violent outbursts, and ha[d] been exacerbated by 
disrespectful, cruel, and even hateful social media posts from 
students from both schools.”163 But nothing in the lyrics S.J. sang in 
her post was racist; and although the language in the post may have 
been foul, it is unclear to whom at Ridgeline S.J.’s post could have 
been interpreted as being “cruel” or “hateful.” 
Unless it could be shown that the song had been consistently 
used to taunt students at Ridgeline, or some other context-specific 
reason why that song would be seen as an attack at Ridgeline 
students, it seems odd to assume that, just because the song had 
swear words, students at Ridgeline could reasonably be expected 
to feel disrespected or targeted by the snap. 
Therefore, a myriad of variables would have all had to perfectly 
align for S.J.’s snap to truly cause a substantial disruption. And, 
 
 163. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order at 3, Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. District, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
00057-DAK), 2018 WL 6831878. 
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when the likelihood of a disturbance is so hypothetical, schools 
should not be justified in stifling students’ speech. 
Likewise, in Doninger, the school claimed that Avery 
Doninger’s post had caused a substantial disruption merely 
because administrators had received more phone call and emails 
than on average, they had been made late to some meetings, and a 
group of upset students had temporarily gathered outside the 
administration’s office. While receiving more phone calls and 
emails may have made for busier days for administrators, it is 
doubtful that this could have caused a major disruption for the 
school. When administrators are juggling the many responsibilities 
of running a high school, it can only be expected that they may 
occasionally be made late for meetings, or sometimes experience an 
overwhelming influx of phone calls and emails. Finally, although 
an upset group of students was gathered outside the 
administration’s office, after Avery explained that Jamfest was not 
actually cancelled, the students dispersed without further problem. 
The administration did not have to lift a finger and nothing in the 
case mentions that classes, or other school activities, were 
negatively impacted by this event. 
Although schools do not have to wait for a substantial 
disruption to occur, it was unreasonable for administrators to 
forecast that Avery’s post would cause further substantial 
disruption. Administrators did not even know about Avery’s post 
until two weeks after she had shared her thoughts. Nothing in the 
Doninger case indicates that serious problems over Jamfest were 
continuing by that point. Instead, the administration’s 
determination that a two-week-old post would create a substantial 
disruption seems questionable at best.  
In sum, “Avery was still disciplined, though her online speech 
did not cause actual disruption, and the possibility that it would 
cause a disruption had essentially passed.”164 
If the events that took place in Johnson and Doninger can be 
considered substantial disruptions, even relatively mild, everyday 
events can be classified as substantial disruptions.  School rivalries, 
even heated ones, are not uncommon. And whenever a student 
chooses to defy the status quo, or question authority, there will 
 
 164.  Miller, supra note 20, at 324. 
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inevitably be some level of disruption. As the Court explained in 
Tinker, “any departure from absolute regimentation may cause 
trouble. Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. 
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance.”165 But disruptions of this sort are 
merely the occupational hazard administrators take on when they 
run a school.166 
Unfortunately, until students are given greater protections, 
inconveniences can constitute substantial disruptions, and highly 
speculative concerns can constitute a reasonable forecast of what 
will occur in the aftermath of a student’s speech.  
III. A MODIFIED STANDARD TO BALANCE STUDENT 
AND SCHOOL RIGHTS 
A. Modified Tinker Standard 
Based on the problems in the above approaches, this Note 
advocates for a new legal test that will better balance the rights of 
students and the needs of schools to maintain order and efficiency. 
I refer to this approach as the Modified Tinker Standard. Under this 
standard, three key elements must be met before a student 
participating in an extracurricular activity can be penalized for 
their online, off-campus speech. First, students must be put on 
unambiguous notice of the specific ways in which participation in 
extracurricular activities will impact their rights and 
responsibilities. Second, schools must be able to show that there is 
a clear connection between the unique needs of a particular 
extracurricular activity and the speech restrictions associated with 
the activity. Third, as an additional protection to students, there 
should be a rebuttable presumption that a single, one-time 
infraction of an extracurricular activity’s social media policy does 
not constitute a substantial disruption. 
If a school can meet the first two elements, and, if necessary, 
overcome the rebuttable presumption that a single infraction of the 
extracurricular’s social media policy does not constitute a 
 
 165. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 166. See id. at 508–09. 
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substantial disruption, then the school would be entitled to the 
benefits of the fourth and final element of the Modified Tinker 
Standard. Under this final element of the Modified Tinker Standard, a 
school is permitted to prove that a substantial disruption has 
occurred even if the substantial disruption is limited to the 
disruption of a single extracurricular activity. Put another way, this 
provides a lower bar for schools to prove substantial disruption: 
rather than showing that there was a schoolwide disruption, the 
school would only have to prove that a single extracurricular group 
had been disrupted. 
As further discussion of each element of this test will show, the 
Modified Tinker Standard would be effective for two key reasons. 
First, it will provide protections to students that, in recent cases, 
have been all but nonexistent. Second, at the same time, this 
standard provides new benefits for schools and will allow schools 
to remain flexible and responsive to the needs of different 
extracurricular activities. 
1. Unambiguous notice 
Schools must be required to show that students who have 
chosen to participate in an extracurricular activity have been put on 
notice that their participation impacts their rights and 
responsibilities. Preferably, students and parents should be given 
such notice in writing, such as in a disclosure slip given to parents 
and students. Additionally, coaches and club advisors should take 
the time to explain the standards to parents and students. 
Next, it is critical that such notice is written and explained in 
such a way that will be unambiguous to students—including those 
that do not necessarily share the general school community’s ideas 
of what constitutes “appropriate” speech. For example, in the 
Johnson case, the coaches had explained to the cheer squad that they 
should not post anything that would “do dishonor to themselves, 
their family, or their school.”167 In terms of the written information 
students were provided about the cheer squad’s social media 
policy, students were simply informed that “[m]embers w[ould] be 
dismissed for improper social media usage.”168 
 
 167. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1308. 
 168. Id. (first alteration in original). 
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Statements such as these fail to recognize that a team is made 
up of unique individuals, who may have very different views as to 
what it means to “dishonor” themselves, or what it means to be 
“inappropriate.” 
Instead, telling students that it is not permissible to use racial 
slurs, complain about their coach, or other more concrete examples, 
would likely be much more effective in clarifying to students what 
is and is not acceptable conduct. Such a mechanism will also ensure 
that, before schools impose a speech requirement on students who 
participate in extracurricular activities, administrators and coaches 
will have carefully considered and defined what types of speech 
will actually hurt the extracurricular program. In turn, this will 
prevent schools from overreacting to students’ posts that do not 
legitimately constitute a substantial disruption to an extracurricular 
activity. 
In addition to these benefits, requiring unambiguous notice to 
students is consonant with Supreme Court precedent established in 
cases where the government seeks to limit citizens’ speech: a law is 
unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide an “ascertainable 
standard of conduct.”169 Otherwise, citizens, and especially 
students, who often will not have the resources to fight their 
school’s policies and sanctions, will “steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone” of the prohibited speech.170 Not only will such an incentive 
to self-censor have a negative effect on students’ personal lives, it 
will also prevent schools from fulfilling what the Supreme Court 
has stated is one of its “vital” goals, which is to facilitate a “robust 
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of 
tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”171 
Thus, although such “disciplinary rules need not be as detailed 
as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions[,]”172 schools 
must be required to prove that, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the student was put on notice, in unambiguous language, of the 
 
 169. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). 
 170. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
 171. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). 
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ways in which their participation in an extracurricular activity 
impacts their online, off-campus speech. 
2. Clear connection standard 
In order to penalize a student’s speech, schools must be able to 
show that, objectively, there is a clear connection between the 
relevant social media policy and the specific purposes of the 
extracurricular activity. 
Requiring a clear connection ensures that overzealous 
administrators and coaches are not overreaching into students’ 
lives and restricting student speech when such speech restrictions 
are unnecessary to the relevant extracurricular program. “Disliking 
or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an 
acceptable justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.”173 
Likewise, a student’s participation in an extracurricular activity 
should not be carte blanche for administrators and coaches to 
regulate the students’ speech just to avoid “image” problems or 
speech that personally makes them feel uncomfortable. 
Anything less than a clear connection standard opens the door 
for schools to attach greater responsibilities to extracurricular 
activities simply by creating broad “educational purposes” for an 
activity. For example, if all an administrator or coach has to show 
is that the restriction on students’ speech is for an “educational 
purpose,” or that it is “reasonably related” to the goal of the 
extracurricular activity, schools will nearly always be able to show 
that the social media policies that it has implemented are 
“necessary.”174 Many things may relate to an extracurricular 
program, but if they are not integral to the program, the value in 
allowing schools to prohibit such speech is likely low—especially 
when viewed in light of the chilling effect that additional social 
media restrictions will have on students’ speech. Additionally, 
extracurricular programs often purport to teach a variety of skills, 
but that does not mean that students in every extracurricular 
activity should necessarily be held to all of those educational 
standards on their social media accounts. For example, although 
 
 173. Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 
(E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 174. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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nearly all extracurricular programs may consider one of their goals 
to be teaching leadership skills, this does not mean that a school 
should hold every student who participates in any extracurricular 
activity to the same standards of conduct as a member of student 
government. 
In addition to the ways in which the clear connection standard 
will protect students from sweeping speech codes, this standard is 
already supported by statements the Supreme Court has made 
regarding schools’ authority to regulate student speech that occurs 
off-campus, during a student’s personal time. For example, in 
discussing the Fraser case, the Court specifically emphasized that, 
although the school was allowed to limit Fraser’s speech, which 
occurred on-campus, “the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school.”175 This fact, which the Court again 
reiterated in Morse,176 indicates that although “the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings[,]”177 schools may be 
required to meet a higher burden of proof when a student’s speech 
occurs off-campus, during a student’s personal time. Further, the 
requirement that there be a clear connection between a school’s 
speech policy and the needs of an extracurricular activity also 
comports with the more general First Amendment principle that if 
a speech restriction is content-based, or viewpoint-based, then such 
restrictions must meet some level of scrutiny. 
Therefore, the clear connection standard not only ensures that 
students are not forced to submit to broad speech codes in order to 
participate in an extracurricular activity, it also ensures that, just 
like in any other case where the government seeks to limit speech 
because of its content or viewpoint, school policies are actually 
scrutinized. 
3. Rebuttable presumption against one-time infractions causing 
substantial disruption 
There should be a rebuttable presumption that a one-time 
disciplinary infraction does not constitute a substantial disruption. 
 
 175. Id. at 266. 
 176. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007). 
 177. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
340–42 (1985)). 
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As has been discussed, the Tinker standard is so broad that it is 
incredibly difficult for courts to decide when “school discipline 
cross[es] the line from merely punishing speech that the school 
disagrees with, to punishing speech that the school foresees would 
cause a substantial disruption[.]”178 As a result, what constitutes a 
substantial disruption in one jurisdiction will not necessarily fit the 
bill in another jurisdiction. Thus, adding a presumption that tips 
the scale in favor of students will provide clarity to the Tinker 
analysis and, in turn, this will help improve uniformity across 
jurisdictions. It will also ensure that courts are not overly 
deferential to a school’s interpretation of what constitutes a 
substantial disruption—something that has been a consistent 
problem in past cases. 
Additionally, this presumption will incentivize schools to 
ensure that if they want to take extreme measures to punish 
students for their speech, such as dismissing a student from a team, 
they must have equally extreme facts to back up such a substantial, 
impactful decision. This, of course, does not mean that a student’s 
one-time post could never be enough to meet the substantial 
disruption standard. If a school can show that tensions are already 
running high at a school, a single, well-timed comment may be 
enough to risk a substantial disruption to the school or to the 
extracurricular activity itself. For example, if there have been 
serious problems with racial hostilities at a school, a student’s 
online comment targeting an opposing racial group could be 
enough to constitute a substantial disruption. Instead, what schools 
cannot do under this standard is immediately punish student 
speech and then craft a creative storyline to prove that such 
punishment was merited merely because if everything went for the 
worse, there was a possibility that the students’ speech could have 
caused a disruption. 
Such a presumption will also have the additional benefit of 
ensuring that schools take less extreme punitive measures when 
they disagree with students’ online speech. For example, rather 
than immediately dismissing a student from the team, it may be 
equally effective to give the student a warning or some lesser 
 
 178. Samantha M. Levin, Note, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to 
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’ Online 
Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 861 (2011). 
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punishment, such as cleaning team equipment. Such measures will 
still teach students that their speech has consequences, without 
immediately robbing students of the critical learning opportunities 
that extracurricular activities provide. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, adding this 
presumption to the Tinker test will help prevent schools and courts 
from “strangl[ing] the free mind at its source and teach[ing] youth 
to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.”179 The Tinker standard was intended to protect 
“fundamental rights” and ensure that student expression was not 
confined to “sentiments that are officially approved.”180 However, 
applied in isolation, courts relying on the Tinker standard do not 
consistently attain this goal. Thus, adding this presumption will 
ensure that the Tinker standard will be applied as the Supreme 
Court intended it to be. 
4. Tinker, specifically applied to extracurriculars 
Finally, if a school can prove that these three elements have 
been met, then the school would be entitled to the Tinker standard 
as applied to the specific extracurricular activity at issue. Although 
some courts have already interpreted Tinker as having such an 
application,181 other courts seem to feel compelled to show that a 
student’s actions also caused a schoolwide disruption. For example, 
both the Doninger and Johnson courts reviewed the ways in which a 
schoolwide disruption had allegedly occurred, even though it 
would have been more believable and legitimate for them to merely 
prove that the extracurricular activity itself had been disrupted.182 
Instead, if the three, above-described standards were met, it 
would be enough for the school to show that there had been a 
substantial disruption to the specific extracurricular activity. This 
would allow schools to determine that there has been a substantial 
disruption, even if the disruption was isolated to a relatively small 
 
 179. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (quoting W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 180. Id. at 511. 
 181. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 587–89 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 182. Likely, this stems from the fact that some of the language in Tinker indicates that 
the Court intended for the substantial disruption test to only apply in the context of a 
schoolwide disruption. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (referring to a substantial disruption to 
“school affairs,” “school premises,” and “school activities”). 
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group. For example, if a member of student government has been 
cyberbullying another student, this will not likely lead to a 
substantial disruption of the whole school. But, bullying is likely to 
be highly disruptive to the life of the student being cyberbullied 
and it is antithetical to the purpose of student government. Or, if a 
member of a school’s swim team is consistently making derogatory 
comments about the team coach online, this likely would not 
constitute a disruption to the school, but it could reasonably be 
construed to lead to serious problems for the swim team’s unity 
and respect for their coach. 
In addition to these benefits, allowing schools to have the 
flexibility that Tinker provides is an appropriate counterbalance to 
the above-described mechanisms for protecting students’ rights. 
Just as students’ freedom of speech must be protected, the Supreme 
Court has also repeatedly emphasized that “maintaining security 
and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in 
school disciplinary procedures.”183 Further, schools have a duty, 
not only to facilitate students’ discussion of controversial views, but 
also to teach students “the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior” and the “habits and manners of civility.”184 Therefore, 
although relying on the Tinker standard still opens the door to some 
level of uncertainty in judicial decision making, when combined 
with the appropriate safeguards, it is still the ideal method for 
dealing with such student speech cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Balancing students’ First Amendment rights and schools’ needs 
to effectively manage their extracurricular activities is of critical 
importance. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has yet to 
definitively rule on the question of whether schools can condition 
students’ participation in extracurricular activities on 
“appropriate” social media use. As a result, lower courts have come 
to radically different conclusions even when they are presented 
with nearly identical fact patterns. Additionally, although 
analytical frameworks for how courts should rule on these cases 
 
 183. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 184. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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have begun to emerge, neither of the two most popular frameworks 
for resolving student speech cases in the extracurricular context are 
sufficient. This is because, under either approach, students’ free 
speech rights are nearly always subjected to the whims and 
preferences of school administrators. 
It is critical to ensure that students truly understand what they 
are getting into when they choose to participate in extracurricular 
activities, and that courts do not unduly defer to a school’s 
definition of what constitutes a substantial disruption.  At the same 
time, utilizing a modified version of the Tinker standard provides 
schools with the necessary flexibility to define key standards for 
their extracurricular programs. Through implementing such 
measures, a single post will not be make-or-break for a student’s 
education, and school administrators and coaches can return their 
full focus to what they do best: improving students’ lives through 
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